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Surveillance report

Evaluating the importation of yellow fever
cases into China in 2016 and strategies
used to prevent and control the spread of
the disease
Chao Li,a Dan Li,a Shirley JoAnn Smart,b Lei Zhou,a,c Peng Yang,d Jianming Ou,e Yi He,f Ruiqi Ren,a Tao Ma,g Nijuan
Xiang,a Haitian Sui,a Yali Wang,a Jian Zhao,a Chaonan Wang,a Yeping Wang,a Daxin Ni,a Isaac Chun-Hai Fung,b
Dexin Li,h Yangmu Huang,i and Qun Li,a
Correspondence to Qun Li (email: liqun@chinacdc.cn)

During the yellow fever epidemic in Angola in 2016, cases of yellow fever were reported in China for the first time. The
11 cases, all Chinese nationals returning from Angola, were identified in March and April 2016, one to two weeks after
the peak of the Angolan epidemic. One patient died; the other 10 cases recovered after treatment. This paper reviews the
epidemiological characteristics of the 11 yellow fever cases imported into China. It examines case detection and disease
control and surveillance, and presents recommendations for further action to prevent additional importation of yellow fever
into China.

T

he 2016 yellow fever outbreak in Angola led
to renewed attention to this often-fatal disease.
Of the 4306 suspected cases reported, 376
individuals died (mortality rate, 8.7%).1 The outbreak
was declared to have been one of the largest and most
challenging yellow fever outbreaks in recent years by
the World Health Organization (WHO), in part because
of its international spread to other countries, including
China.
Yellow fever is a zoonotic disease that is endemic in
tropical regions of Africa and South America. It is caused
by the yellow fever virus, an arbovirus that belongs to
the Flavivirus genus.2 The virus is transmitted between
humans, or from monkeys to humans, through the bite
of infected mosquitoes belonging to the Aedes and
Haemogogus genera, respectively. Yellow fever causes
an estimated 30 000 deaths each year, most of which
are in Africa, where more than 500 million people are at
risk for yellow fever.3 An additional 400 million people

a

in Central and South America are also at risk.3 Though
Aedes aegypti mosquitoes are found in China (primarily
in Fujian Province) and other parts of Asia, yellow fever
had never, before 2016, been reported in China or any
other part of Asia.
In 2015, more than 200 000 Chinese nationals
were working or conducting business in Angola.4 According to the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), dozens of the
Chinese nationals in Angola contracted yellow fever
during the 2016 outbreak, resulting in eight deaths in Angola.5 Facing the possibility of an imported yellow fever
epidemic, China developed a national yellow fever control
and prevention protocol,6 and took steps to strengthen
surveillance at airports and health-care facilities and to
implement emergency vector surveillance. Despite these
efforts, 11 Chinese nationals who were infected during
the outbreak in Angola imported yellow fever into China
in 2016.
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Considering frequent travel, labour relationships,
and close trade with endemic countries in South America
and Africa, China faces a continued risk of yellow fever
importation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
examine China’s response to the importation of its first
yellow fever cases, particularly the emergency response,
as well as case detection and disease surveillance and
control.

METHODS
We obtained and analysed data collected as part of
China’s emergency response. The following paragraphs
describe the steps taken to identify and document the
imported cases of yellow fever and to collect demographic and epidemiological data, as well as clinical
information.

Case definition
Suspected cases of yellow fever were identified by clinicians based on clinical manifestations consistent with
yellow fever, which included fever, jaundice, liver and
kidney dysfunction, vomiting, and bleeding, as well as
epidemiological history (i.e. history of travel or residence
in the last 14 days before symptom onset). Confirmed
cases were defined as suspected cases that tested positive for yellow fever virus using nucleic acid testing.6

Case discovery
Yellow fever cases imported into China were either
discovered by AQSIQ staff during point-of-entry screening or later reported by treating health-care providers.
Febrile passengers passing through the point of entry
were identified via temperature screening and were
transported to the hospital for diagnosis and treatment.
Travellers with mild or moderate symptoms that had
not been detected by entry screening were identified by
health-care providers in hospitals while seeking medical
care. Clinicians identified and documented symptoms
consistent with yellow fever to identify suspected cases.
When a suspected case of yellow fever needed to be
confirmed, patient blood samples were sent to the provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
for laboratory testing by real-time reverse transcriptase
polymerase chain reaction (rRT–PCR).7 All information
was reported to the local health administrative departments after disease confirmation.8
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Data collection
Once a suspected case was diagnosed by a laboratory, the
provincial CDC conducted a field investigation to collect
demographic and epidemiological information (including
travel history, i.e. the dates of arrival in Angola and return
to China and yellow fever vaccination status) and clinical
information (including symptoms, time of symptom onset
and date of hospital visit).

Vector surveillance
Routine surveillance of Aedes density has been conducted
in China for many years. According to the surveillance
protocol,9 all provinces are classified into three groups
(high, middle and low) depending on the level of risk of
mosquito-borne disease transmission. In high-risk areas,
surveillance is conducted throughout the year. In middle- and low-risk areas, surveillance is conducted from
May to November and from June to September. After
each of the imported cases of yellow fever was identified,
emergency monitoring was conducted to measure the
mosquito density within a radius of 200 metres of the
patient’s residence. The Breteau Index (BI) was calculated to determine the number of positive containers per
100 households inspected.9

Ethics approval and consent to participate
The case information was collected according to the
regulations of the Law of the People’s Republic of China
on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases as
a part of the emergency response, which was exempted
from ethics approval and consent to participate.

RESULTS
Case characteristics
A total of 11 cases of yellow fever were reported in China,
all imported from Angola. All were Chinese nationals living in Luanda, the capital of Angola, at the time of the
outbreak. Seven cases were residents of Fujian Province,
two of Jiangsu Province, and one each of Zhejiang Province and Sichuan Province. All cases were identified in
weeks 11 to 15 of 2016, approximately one to two weeks
after the peak of the Angolan epidemic. The patient age
range was 18–52 years (median: 42 years). Eight were
male, and three were female. Eight were retailers, and
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Demographic characteristics of imported cases of yellow fever

Table 1.
Case
no.

Sex

Age
(years)

Date of symptom onset

Reporting
region

Location
at time of
diagnosis

Vaccination status

Reporting
institution

Notes

Data
source

1

M

32

8 March 2016

Beijing

Beijing

Not vaccinated before symptom onset

AQSIQ

Died of the disease

10,19–
21

2

M

46

5 March 2016

Shanghai

Shanghai

Unknown

AQSIQ

22

3

M

44

9 March 2016

Beijing

Beijing

Not vaccinated before travel
to Angola

AQSIQ

10,23

4

M

44

11 March 2016

Beijing

Beijing

Not vaccinated before travel
to Angola

AQSIQ

10,23

5

M

50

6 March 2016

Beijing

Beijing

Not vaccinated before travel
to Angola

AQSIQ

6

F

42

11 March 2016

Fujian

Fuzhou

Not vaccinated before travel to
Angola. Vaccinated in Angola
on 7 March 2016, 3 days
before symptom onset.

Medical
Institution

10,25

7

M

42

17 March 2016

Fujian

Fuzhou

Vaccinated 7 days before
symptom onset

Medical
Institution

10,26

8

F

36

15 March 2016

Fujian

Fuzhou

Vaccinated 5 years before
symptom onset

Medical
Institution

10,26

9

F

53

13 March 2016

Fujian

Fuzhou

Vaccinated 1 day before symptom onset

Medical
Institution

10,26

10

M

18

12 March 2016

Fujian

Fuzhou

Vaccinated 10 days before
symptom onset

Medical
Institution

10,27

11

M

29

5 April 2016

Beijing

Beijing

Vaccinated 10 months before
symptom onset

AQSIQ

Received treatments in multiple hospitals in Angola from 6
to 16 March 2016

Sought medical care at a local
hospital in Angola

10,24

10,11

AQSIQ, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine.

three were labourers. Ten reported having been bitten
by a mosquito at least six days before symptom onset;
the other patient (case no. 2) was unsure if he had been
bitten. Six patients reported having received yellow fever
vaccinations. Case nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10 were vaccinated
less than 14 days before system onset. Case no. 8 was
vaccinated in China five years before symptom onset,
and Case no. 11 was vaccinated in Namibia 10 months
before the onset of illness (Table 1).10

Case detection
Ten cases received medical treatment in Luanda but were
not diagnosed with yellow fever; the other case, having
only mild symptoms, did not seek medical treatment
before returning to China. Seven cases returned to China
through the Beijing Capital International Airport; the other
four entered through Shanghai. Six cases were reported
within the city of entry, and five were eventually reported
in Fujian Province, where they had sought medical care.
Of the six cases discovered by AQSIQ, two cases with
mild illness self-declared their symptoms at the time of
entry (Table 1).
https://ojs.wpro.who.int/

Disease control and surveillance
The Chinese Government took steps to strengthen
surveillance at airports and health-care facilities and implemented emergency vector surveillance in an attempt
to prevent further cases of yellow fever. Specifically, the
Government intensified multisectoral coordination and
collaboration; strengthened surveillance, vector monitoring and risk assessment; enhanced clinical management
of yellow fever cases; conducted vector control activities;
carried out public risk communication activities; and deployed a medical team to Angola to provide yellow fever
vaccination to unvaccinated Chinese nationals.11

DISCUSSION
We describe the 11 cases of imported yellow fever in
China, most of which were discovered within two weeks
after the peak of the outbreak in Angola in 2016. After
the outbreak in Angola was announced, China quickly
released a protocol for yellow fever prevention and control.6 At the same time, AQSIQ, in the hope of preventing
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yellow fever from entering China, issued an announcement that included instructions for screening travellers
and checking vaccination certificates.12
Several strategies were implemented to control
the spread of yellow fever in China. First, all travellers
from Angola were required to present yellow fever vaccination certificates. Those without a certificate were
isolated at the point of entry or their place of residence
for six days. Second, all travellers from affected countries
were screened upon entry. Anyone who self-declared or
who was suspected of having yellow fever was isolated
at the entry point. There, AQSIQ staff administered an
epidemiological survey and collected blood samples for
testing. Third, travellers from Angola and other epidemic
countries were required to perform self-health monitoring
for six days after entering China. If suspicious symptoms
occurred, the affected traveller was asked to report to
a health-care provider, disclose their travel history and
receive prompt treatment. Additionally, aircraft, containers and other cargo from the epidemic countries were
targeted for mosquito control. It was also recommended
that persons travelling to Angola and other epidemic
countries should be vaccinated again for yellow fever before departure from China. For the imported yellow fever
cases, emergent monitoring of mosquito-borne vectors
was also performed.
Areas recommended for improvement include
epidemic information sharing, risk warning and health
education for Chinese nationals in Angola and other yellow fever-endemic countries. According to our investigation, Chinese nationals in Angola are generally employees
sent by private companies or individual business people,
primarily from Fuqing City in Fujian Province. More
than 200 000 Chinese nationals live and work outside
China,3 so timely health-related communication between
health officials, companies and overseas workers could
help protect China’s expatriate population from public
health threats in their countries of temporary residence.
Overseas workers in Angola should have received a yellow fever vaccination before their departure from China.
Information about the yellow fever epidemic, if received
from their companies or Chinese health officials, might
have encouraged personal prevention measures such as
mosquito-avoidance precautions. Information on travellers with yellow fever, especially those who returned to
China for treatment, should have been reported by the
employing companies to the Chinese embassy or Govern-
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ment, which would have provided valuable information
for disease prevention. Required vaccination and improved communication are also crucial for individual business people who are travelling to yellow fever-endemic
countries. All inbound passengers should be required to
present proof of vaccination if they are arriving from yellow fever-endemic countries. Health education materials
(e.g. videos, posters, warning signs, brochures and text
messages) could be provided at the points of entry by
inspection and quarantine officials to encourage inbound
passengers to self-declare symptoms of a potential communicable disease.13
Additional strategies have been identified and are
recommended for reducing the risk of importation and
spread of infectious diseases in China. For instance,
China could strengthen regulations and legislation to put
an end to the fabrication of false yellow fever vaccination
certificates, a practice used to circumvent the vaccination regulations of the International Health Regulations,
or IHR (2005). Globally, governments, including that of
China, could ensure their citizens receive yellow fever
vaccination when travelling to countries that recommend
it, could tighten border controls to ensure incoming
visitors from yellow fever-endemic countries have proof
of vaccination and could make public policies a priority in
the prevention of diseases among travellers.14
The active period for the Aedes aegypti mosquito in
Fujian Province was reported to be from May to October
in 2016.15 However, the result of emergency monitoring (BI: 15) indicated continued transmission risk of
mosquito-borne diseases after the peak period. Thus, the
public should be educated to eliminate containers that
can hold water in which mosquitoes may breed.

Risk of disease importation
Due to frequent travel and close trade with yellow feverendemic countries in Africa and South America, China
faces a continued risk of yellow fever importation as travel
volume has increased. Travel patterns to and from yellow
fever-endemic regions in relation to China indicate that
Angola sends the second-highest number of travellers into
China and also receives the second-highest number of
Chinese visitors.14 During the years 2010–2030, tourist
arrivals in Asia and the Pacific are expected to increase
by 331 million, bringing the total number of tourists to
about 535 million in 2030. With this increase in travel,
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there will be a concomitant increase in the importation
of infectious diseases. Due to the presence of the urban
mosquito vector, Aedes aegypti, among large unvaccinated populations, 1.8 billion people in Asia were put at
risk for yellow fever by international travellers during the
2016 outbreak.14 In Angola, by September 2016, near the
end of the 2016 yellow fever outbreak, 884 laboratoryconfirmed cases of yellow fever had been reported, with
373 deaths. The confirmed cases of yellow fever in China
were the first-ever cases to be imported into Asia.14
In 2012, a total of 475 761 air passengers travelled
to China from yellow fever-endemic countries. Of those,
195 291 travelled from the South American countries of
Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Venezuela, and 104 854
travelled from the African countries of Angola, Ethiopia,
Ghana and Nigeria. During that same year, 466 832 air
passengers from China travelled to yellow fever-endemic
countries. The importation of yellow fever from endemic
countries by unvaccinated Chinese workers is a serious
concern, as they are apparently able to circumvent the
mandated IHR (2005) regulations that require proof of
vaccination for entry into China from certain yellow feverendemic countries, including Angola.14

Vaccinations
Finally, although yellow fever is a vaccine-preventable
disease, the vaccination rate of yellow fever in Chinese
nationals in Angola is estimated to be very low.16 Vaccinations should be required for all Chinese nationals going to
or returning from countries where yellow fever is endemic,
as per the WHO recommendations.11 This would protect
Chinese citizens who are residing in countries such as
Angola and Brazil, where the risk of contracting yellow
fever is substantial.
The WHO risk assessment report of yellow fever
infection in non-immunized travellers underlined the need
to reinforce the implementation of yellow fever vaccination requirements and highlighted the risk of international
spread of the disease through non-immunized travellers.11 A safe and effective vaccine for yellow fever has
been available for more than 50 years. The licensed, live
attenuated yellow fever vaccine produces immunization
within 10 days and has a long duration of immunity.
However, it is in short supply, with only about 80 million
doses produced annually. An estimated half a million
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doses of the vaccine would be needed annually to cover
the Chinese population travelling to yellow fever-endemic
countries. Yellow fever 17D vaccine is manufactured in
China for the domestic market and therefore is available,
although the supply is limited.12
Routine vaccination for children living in countries at
risk for yellow fever is also recommended by WHO.3 The
vaccine confers long-term protection (10 years or more,
possibly lifelong) within 10 days for more than 90–95% of
individuals who receive the vaccine. Within 30 days after
vaccination, 99% of those immunized develop immunity.
A single dose is likely to provide lifelong immunity. The
yellow fever vaccination certificate is now valid for the
duration of the life of the person vaccinated.17
Among the 11 cases, there were two cases with
vaccination failure. Although vaccination failure for yellow fever is unusual, some studies showed up to 26%
seronegativity in vaccines after mass immunization campaigns.18 External factors such as improper cold chain
handling, storage and administration may be the cause
of failure.
In conclusion, we have described the first-ever
importation of yellow fever cases in China, discussed
the methods used for case detection and prevention of
imported infectious disease, and provided several recommendations for disease prevention and control. Experiences gained from the response to imported yellow fever
cases in 2016 can be used to protect Chinese travellers
from yellow fever and to prevent new importations of the
disease.
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